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Abstract
A seminal work by Fumagalli and Motta (2006) explored that an incumbent manufacturer
cannot deter an entry by exclusive dealing contract with distributors. This paper extends the
￿ amework of Fumagalli and Motta and examines a situation in which an incumbent distributor
tries to deter an entry of e¢ cient distributor by exclusive dealing contracts with manufacturers.
The result of this paper is quite opposite to that of Fumagalli and Motta. The exclusion can be
successful. It is an unique equilibrium. In this sence, the e⁄ects of exclusive dealing depends
on the mareket stiructure. Moreover, we extend our model with an entrant even in upstream.
It may decrease the possibility of exclusion but may promote the ine¢ cient vertical relation
between the entrants.
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1 Introduction
Whether exclusive dealing contracts prevent e¢ cient entries or not is one of the main issues in
the economic literature on vertical restraints. Recently, Fumagalli and Motta (2006) and Simpson
and Wickelgren (2007) extend this issue to the case when a manufacturer o⁄ers exclusive dealing
contracts to downstream distributors. This strand of literature examines the cases where one large
incumbent manufacturer faces a potential e¢ cient entrant. Their results have strong impact on
the literature about exclusive dealing contracts. Fumagalli and Motta (2006), hereafter FM, have
shown that when distributors compete, exclusive dealing contracts between the incumbent and
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1distributors may not deter the e¢ cient entrant1. We extend FM￿ s setting and examine the e⁄ect
of exclusive dealing when distributors are large and have bargaining power over upstream ￿rms.
We will show that exclusive dealing contracts between incumbents deter the e¢ cient entrant. In
this sense, the e⁄ect of exclusive dealing contracts is much di⁄erent from the results of FM.
Large distributor setting is realistic and important for considering competition policies. Re-
cently, large distributors and their buying power have a growing concern as documented in An-
titrust Law Journal (2005), Dobson and Waterson (1999), Rey (2000) and Fumagalli and Motta
(2008). So called ￿mega distributors￿ , such as Wal-Mart, are highly accepted by ￿nal consumers
who want to buy at low price. Many articles have been written about the observation of Wal-
Mart￿ s demanding orders for producers(e.g. Moore (1993), Norek (1997)). In addition, antitrust
authorities also have become increasingly concerned about distributor￿ s strong bargaining power
(e.g. Competition Commission (2000), Federal Trade Commission (2001)). In order to capture
this "buying power" aspect, we use a "large distributor model"; a model with a large incumbent
in the downstream and a number of identical upstream ￿rms.
In the literature of exclusive dealing contracts, Rasumsen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston
(2000) have explored that exclusive dealing contracts may deter e¢ cient entries. They have shown
that buyers may not reject the exclusive dealing o⁄er from an incumbent manufacturer when an
entrant has to pay su¢ cient amount of entry cost. The reason is that the sales amount to a
rejected buyer (or free buyer ) is insu¢ cient and the entrant cannot cover the ￿xed entry cost.
Hence there is a possibility that all buyers accept the exclusive dealing contract. Fumagalli and
Motta (2006) have shown that if buyers are distributors, this result cannot be applied. There are
two main reasons. First if buyers are distributors, the sales to a rejected buyer are su¢ cient to
cover the ￿xed entry cost since the distributor can sell a su¢ cient amount of product to consumers.
Second, the bene￿t of rejecting the exclusive dealing o⁄er for a buyer is signi￿cantly high, and
thus it is di¢ cult for the incumbent to compensate all opportunity costs for the exclusive dealing
contracts. From those two reasons, FM concluded that it is di¢ cult to deter the entry by o⁄ering
exclusive dealing contracts to distributors.
This paper shows that the logic of this FM becomes quite opposite if an incumbent distributors
1Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) have shown that when exclusive dealing contracts are breachable by paying
expectation damage, one of the equilibrium is that entrant can enter the market even with fully signed exclusive
dealing contracts by all distributors. However, in this equilibrium, the retail market price is as high as in the case
of upstream monopoly. And they conclude exclusive dealing contracts are ine¢ cient resulting monopoly price and
underproduction.
2o⁄er exclusive dealing contracts to manufacturers to prevent an e¢ cient entrant distributor. Since
we assume there is no entry cost, the minimum capacity problem explored by Rasumsen et al.
(1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) does not exist. Instead, we focus on the second point of
the reasons of FM. In FM, by rejecting the o⁄er, the distributor can get su¢ cient pro￿t since the
incumbent and the entrant compete with each other by their wholesale prices. On the other hand,
in our model, a manufacturer rejected the o⁄er cannot get su¢ cient pro￿t, since the competition
between the incumbent distributor and the entrant distributor decrease the retail price and the
pro￿t of manufacturers. Hence the incumbent distributor may be able to pay the all opportunity
costs for accepting the exclusive contracts of manufacturers and deter the entry as long as the
number of incumbent manufacturers is not so high.
Our result also contrasts sharply to Chicago school￿ s argument (such as Posner (1976), Bork
(1978)) that insisted an incumbent ￿rm cannot exclude an e¢ cient entrant by exclusive dealing
contracts. Basic logic of the argument is that the e¢ cient entrant can generate higher surplus
than the (ine¢ cient) incumbent and thus it is impossible for the incumbent to compensate the
higher surplus and to deter the entry. In the large distributor model, however, the incumbent
distributor does not have to compensate the total surplus. It only has to compensate the gains
of a manufacturer and the e¢ cient distributor. Since the retail price competition between an
incumbent distributor and an entrant distributor makes the retail price lower than the monopoly
price, the pro￿ts of manufacturers and distributors may not become so high although the con-
sumers￿surplus must be higher than the no-entry case. This means the necessary compensation
level becomes not so high, and it may become possible for the incumbent distributor to pay the
all necessary compensations and to exclude an e¢ cient entry by the exclusive dealing contract.
By using this result, we extend our model to a situation with an ine¢ cient entrant in the
upstream. We will show that such ine¢ cient entrants may decrease the possibility of agreement
of exclusive dealing contract. However, with fully signed exclusive contracts, the e¢ cient entrant
distributor decides to enter the market by trading with the ine¢ cient manufacturer. This is
another source of ine¢ ciency caused by the ine¢ cient entry in the upstream.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the basic model with large
distributor. It provides the case where there are N identical producers and shows the condition
of entry deterrence. Section 3 compares our result with FM￿ s result and analyze what causes
this di⁄erence. Section 4 analyses the case where an ine¢ cient entrant emerges at upstream in

















Figure 1: The Large Distributor Model
Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper including some policy implications.
2 The Large Distributor Model
2.1 The Basic Model
We present a simple manufacturer-distributor model. In order to simplify the argument, we
assume that demand of ￿nal consumers is 1 as long as the retail price is equal or lower than v
and that is 0 if the retail price is higher than v2. There are N (￿ 2) identical manufacturers
(M) whose constant marginal cost is cI. There is no ￿xed cost for production. On the other
hand, there is one incumbent distributor (ID) who faces a potential entrant distributor (ED). The
marginal distribution cost of the incumbent distributor is dI and that of the entrant distributor
is dE. We assume that dI > dE, thus the entrant is more e¢ cient than the incumbent (see Figure
1). To enter the downstream market, we assume that ED does not have to pay any entry cost.
Moreover, we assume that v ￿ dI + cI.
Before the new distributor decides to enter the market, the incumbent distributor o⁄ers ex-
clusive dealing contracts to manufacturers. The contracts commit manufacturers, if they sign, to
sell their products only to the incumbent distributor. All contracts are o⁄ered simultaneously and
2In this sense, this paper does not treat the minimum capacity problem, which is explored by Rasmusen et
























nondiscriminatory. S denotes the number of manufacturers that accepted the exclusive dealing
contract. In order to induce manufacturers to sign the contract, ID o⁄ers a compensation x to
each manufacturer. As assumed in FM, any commitments on wholesale prices or distribution
margins are not included in the contract. We assume that contracts cannot be breached also as
assumed in FM.
The timing of the game is as follows (also see Figure 2). At t=0, the incumbent distributor
o⁄ers manufacturers exclusive dealing contracts. At t=1, we have four stages. First, after observ-
ing S, the e¢ cient entrant distributor decides to enter or not. Second, manufacturers compete
with the wholesale prices. Third, distributors decide which manufacturers they will buy from.
Finally, distributors engage in retail price competition a la Bertrand. Here we adopt the tie-break
rule as in the literature, that is, most e¢ cient ￿rm wins price competition if more than two price
o⁄ers are the same. We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and examine the
e⁄ect of e¢ cient entry at the downstream level.
2.2 E⁄ect of Exclusive Contracts
First we examine the market equilibrium when there is no exclusive contract. Since all manu-
facturers have the same cost function, the wholesale price competition among the manufacturers
makes the equilibrium wholesale price, w￿ equal to the marginal production cost, that is w￿ = cI.
Given the equilibrium wholesale price, the equilibrium retail price, p￿ becomes p￿ = cI +dI since
dI > dE . From this competition, the entrant gets ￿E = p￿ ￿(cI +dE) = dI ￿dE and the incum-
bent gets zero. Hence, in order to prevent the entry, the incumbent distributor has an incentive
to o⁄er an exclusive dealing contract to manufacturers before the entry of new distributor. The
e⁄ectiveness of exclusive dealing contracts depends upon whether the compensation payment, x
is a⁄ordably low or too high to o⁄er.
5To derive the necessary compensation level, we should examine how much a manufacturer
can get by rejecting an exclusive dealing contract. Suppose the incumbent distributor o⁄ered a
exclusive dealing contract and all manufacturers accepted the o⁄er, that is S = N. In this case, no
manufacturer can supply a product to the entrant, and the entrant distributor does not enter the
market 3. By the wholesale price competition among the signed manufacturers, the equilibrium
wholesale price, denoted by wN
I (N denotes the number of signer) becomes wN
I = cI, and the
incumbent distributor can set the retail price, pI as pI = v. The pro￿t of the incumbent, ￿I
(without including the compensation payment x) and that of manufacturers (￿S
M and S denotes
"sign") become
￿I = v ￿ cI ￿ dI; (1)
￿S
M = 0:
Next, suppose one manufacturer rejected the o⁄er (hereafter we call it "outsider"), that is
S = N ￿ 1. In this case, the entrant manufacturer has an incentive to enter the market, but
the wholesale price o⁄er to the entrant may di⁄erent from that to the incumbent since only the
outsider can supply the product to the entrant. Since all manufacturers including the outsider
has a chance to supply the product to the incumbent manufacturer, the wholesale price to the
incumbent, wI becomes wI = cI by the price competition among manufacturers. On the other
hand, only the outsider supplies the product to the entrant, and it has an incentive to raise up
the wholesale price o⁄er to the entrant, wE > cI. We will explore how the optimal level of wE
should be determined below.
Given these wholesale prices, the two distributors set their retail prices. The outcome of this
price competition is very simple. If wI +dI = cI +dI ￿ wE +dE, the entrant wins the retail price
competition and get the pro￿t cI+dI￿(wE+dE). On the other hand, if wI+dI = cI+dI < wE+dE,
the incumbent wins the price competition and get the pro￿t wE + dE ￿ (cI + dI).
Since the outsider can anticipate this outcome, it should set its wholesale price to be wE =
cI+dI￿dE and it can get the pro￿t denoted by ￿O, ￿O = dI￿dE. With this outsider￿ s wholesale
price, the pro￿t of the entrant is cI +dI ￿(wE +dE) = 0 and the incumbent loses the retail price
competition and gets nothing. This outcome might be extreme. Since the entrant distributor
3Since we have assumed there is not entry cost, we can also say that the entrant did enter the market but has
chosen to be inactive.
6is an important partner for the outsider, the outsider might not have such a strong bargaining
power to the entrant distributor. Hence we will examine more general cases below, but here we
analyze this extreme case in which the outsider can seize such high pro￿t.
If the compensation level is equal to the pro￿t of the outsider when S = N ￿ 1, any man-
ufacturers has no incentive to reject the exclusive contract. Hence the necessary compensation
level, x￿ becomes as follows, x￿ = ￿O = dI ￿ dE
4. Next, we must check whether this necessary
compensation level is too high for the incumbent distributor to o⁄er or not, that is whether the
incumbent can get more than (or equal to) Nx￿ by deterring the entrant. The incumbent can get
￿I = v ￿cI ￿dI when S = N. This means that as long as v ￿cI ￿dI ￿Nx￿ ￿ 0, the incumbent
distributor has an incentive to o⁄er the exclusive dealing contract and the entry of the entrant
distributor will be deterred in equilibrium. Thus we get the following maximum N, N￿, which
sustains the exclusion5.
v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ N(dI ￿ dE) ￿ 0 ,
N ￿ N￿ =
(v ￿ cI ￿ dI)
dI ￿ dE
: (2)
In the argument above we have only checked the case where there is only one outsider. If
there are more than one outsider, how does the outcome change? To answer this question, let us
suppose there are N ￿ S(￿ 2) outsiders. Even in this case, the wholesale price to the incumbent
must be equal to the marginal production cost, that is wI = cI. On the other hand, the wholesale
price to the entrant may di⁄er from the previous case. It is wE = cI since the price competition
among the outsiders would occur. Hence in the retail price competition, the entrant wins and gets
the pro￿t dI ￿ dE, but the outsiders get nothing. This means the necessary compensation level
is zero. Thus, it is su¢ cient to consider one outsider case to derive the necessary compensation
level. We summarize this outcome above in the next proposition6.This outcome contrasts sharply
to the FM model.
Proposition 1 If an incumbent distributor faces an e¢ cient entrant and the number of upstream
4We assume that if manufacturares are indi⁄erent between signing and rejecting, they sign. In other words, the
incumbent o⁄ers x
￿ = ￿o + ￿ and ￿ is very small.
5Hereafter, let us ignore the integer problem for simplicity.
6Note that even if we assume the exclusive dealing contracts are breachable by paying expectation damage, we
have an unique exclusion equilibrium.
In the large distributor model, we do not have multiple equilibrium that Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) have
without assuming product de⁄erenciation.
7￿rm is less than N￿ = (v ￿ cI ￿ dI)=(dI ￿ dE), there exists an unique equilibrium where the
incumbent excludes the entrant by exclusive dealing contracts.
Proof. (1) First, we examine the market equilibrium when S = N. If S = N, no manufacturer
supply the product to the entrant distributor. Hence the incumbent distributor chooses its retail
price to be equal to v. On the other hand, the equilibrium wholesale price should be cI by
the price competition among the signed manufacturers. Thus the incumbent distributor gets
￿I = v ￿ cI ￿ dI and signed manufacturers get nothing.
(2) Next, we examine the case in which S = N ￿ 1, that is there is only one outsider. By
the price competition between the entrant manufacturer and the incumbent manufacturer, the
equilibrium retail price p￿ becomes p￿ = Max[wI +dI;wE +dE]. The incumbent distributor gets
Max[0;wE + dE ￿ wI ￿ dI] and the entrant distributor gets Max[0;wI + dI ￿ wE ￿ dE]. Since
all manufacturers (including the outsider) have a chance to supply the product to the Incumbent
distributor, the wholesale price competition among the manufacturers realizes wI = cI. On the
other hand, only the outsider can supply the product to the entrant distributor. Hence the
outsider has a chance to set its wholesale price for entrant, wE, wE > cI. The optimal wholesale
pricing, wE, for the outsider is derived by solving the following problem
Max wE ￿ cI
s:t: wE + dE ￿ cI + dI:
Hence the optimal wE is wE = cI + dI ￿ dE and the pro￿t of the outsider is ￿O = dI ￿ dE .
(3) When S ￿ N ￿2, that is there are more than or equal to two outsiders. Even in this case,
p￿ = Max[wI +dI;wE +dE], the incumbent distributor gets Max[0;wE +dE ￿wI ￿dI], and the
entrant distributor gets Max[0;wI + dI ￿ wE ￿ dE]. Moreover, wI = cI by the price competition
among manufacturers. wE becomes di⁄erent, however. Since there are at least two outsiders, by
the price competition among outsiders, wE = cI. Hence all signed manufacturers and all outsiders
get zero pro￿t and p￿ = cI +dI. The incumbent distributor gets zero and the entrant distributor
gets dI ￿ dE > 0.
(4) Since all manufacturers can expect those outcomes at t=0, a manufacturer has an incentive
to reject the exclusive dealing contract If x < dI ￿dE . Hence, x should be equal to the deviation
pro￿t ￿O(= dI ￿ dE).
(5) Lastly we should check whether the incumbent distributor has an incentive to pay xN or
not. Since ￿I = v ￿ cI ￿ dI when S = N, v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ (dI ￿ dE )N is the pro￿tability condition
8for the incumbent distributor who o⁄ers the exclusive dealing contract to all N manufacturers.
By rearranging this condition, we get the resultof the proposition.
In the next section, we will examine why our result is quite opposite to that of FM. Before that,
we will check the robustness of this result. First, we examine the situation in which distributors
o⁄er the wholesale price to the manufacturers. Even if the incumbent distributor o⁄ers a wholesale
price to manufacturers, the wholesale price is wI = cI since this o⁄er is the best for the incumbent.
As long as the o⁄er is a type of "take-it-or-leave-it", signed manufacturers should accept the o⁄er.
If the entrant distributor has a bargaining power to o⁄er such take-it-or-leave-it wholesale price
o⁄er to the outsider, the entrant also sets wE = cI. This means the outsider get zero pro￿t and
the necessary compensation level is zero. Hence the entry deterrence can be realized for any N.
Next, we examine the situation in which the entrant distributor has a partial bargaining
power to the outsider. In the previous argument, we have assumed that even though the outsider-
entrant line (the vertical structure) can get dI ￿dE but all of this rent goes to the outsider by the
high wholesale price o⁄ered to the entrant distributor. In some cases, however, the entrant may
bargain with the outsider about the wholesale price (i.e. the sharing of the rent). In particular,
the entrant distributor can negotiate the wholesale price with the outsider, and the entrant can
get a bargaining power against the outsider. In order to incorporate such possibility, let us assume
that the wholesale price from the outsider to the entrant distributor, wE becomes as follows,
wE = cI + ￿(dI ￿ dE). (3)
￿ is the parameter of the outsider￿ s bargaining power and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. The outsider and the entrant
separate the integrated pro￿t by this proportion denoted by ￿. Given this wholesale price, the
entrant distributor sets the retail price as cI + dI to win the price competition to the incumbent
distributor. Then the entrant gets
￿E = cI + dI ￿ cI ￿ ￿(dI ￿ dE) ￿ dE = (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE).
In this case, the necessary compensation level becomes, x￿ = ￿(dI ￿ dE). Hence the pro￿t
function of the incumbent when N manufacturers accepted the compensation x￿ is
v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ Nx￿
= v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ N￿(dI ￿ dE)
9From this pro￿t function we get the incumbent￿ s participation constraint as follows;
N ￿ N￿(￿) =
(v ￿ cI ￿ dI)
￿(dI ￿ dE)
: (4)
The previous extreme case is corresponding to the case when ￿ = 1. If ￿ < 1, N￿ < N￿(￿)and it
becomes easier to realize the entry deterrence by the incumbent distributor7.
3 The FM Model
3.1 FM￿ s Main Results
In this section, we summarize the basic result of Fumagalli and Motta (2006) to compare their
result with ours. We also examine our result￿ s robustness by introducing the small ￿xed cost as
FM in the following subsection.
First, we explain a simple version of FM￿ s model brie￿ y. An incumbent manufacturer (I)
produces a good at a constant marginal cost, cI. There are N(￿ 2) downstream ￿rms (D) each
with identical marginal distribution cost, dI. We assume the ￿nal consumers￿demand is Q = 1
and the reservation price is v for simplicity8. A potential entrant manufacturer (E) with a lower
marginal cost cE < cI is willing to enter the upstream market. We also assume there is not ￿xed
entry cost in this simple version of the model9.
The timing of the game is as follows. At t=0, the incumbent o⁄ers exclusive dealing contracts
to the downstream ￿rms that requires signers to purchase only from the incumbent. Distributors
7Furthermore, when ￿ < 1, we can apply this argument even in the case that N = 1. Let us explain this case
brie￿ y. Here we assume the manufacturer￿ s bargaining power is denoted by ￿ both against the incumbent and the
entrant for simplicity.
When S = N = 1, wI = ￿(v￿cI￿dI) and ￿I = (1￿￿)(v￿cI￿dI)￿Nx
￿. On the other hand, when S = N￿1 = 0,
The incumbent distributor cannot have lower cost than the entrant, and the entrant distributor sets its retail price
be v and the wholesale price becomes, wE = ￿(v ￿ cI ￿ dE). Thus x
￿ = ￿(v ￿ cI ￿ dE), and the condition for
successful exclusion becomes as follows; ￿I = (1￿￿)(v￿cI ￿dI)￿x
￿ ￿ 0 () ￿ ￿ (v￿cI ￿dI)=(2(v￿cI)￿dI ￿dE)
Hence, if the bargaining power of the manufacturer is not so high, the exclusive dealing contract can deter the
entrant even if there exists only one manufacturer. This means that even if the manufacturer has established its
brand name or competes in the di⁄erentiated market, the exclusive dealing contract can be work as entry deterrence
device of the incumbent, when the bargaining power is distributed relatively low to the manufacturer.
8Although the original FM model treats a linear demand function, here we assume this unit demand fuction for
simplicity.
9The original version of FM considers entry cost and examines the minimum capacity constranit problem which
is explored by Rasumsen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000). FM has shown that exclusion is impossible
even if there is entry cost.
10determine to accept or reject it. To induce distributors to sign the contract, the incumbent
o⁄ers each distributor a compensation x. In addition, the contracts cannot be breached and do
not include any commitments on future prices. Although Fumagalli and Motta examined more
general cases, here we focus on the case of simultaneous and nondiscriminatory contract o⁄ers.
S denotes the number of distributors that accept the contract. At t=1, we have four stages.
First, having observed S, the entrant decides to enter or not. Second, active upstream ￿rms o⁄er
their wholesale prices to distributors. The incumbent can o⁄er di⁄erent prices to signers and
to free distributors (here we call them "outsiders" as in the previous section). We denote the
incumbent￿ s o⁄er by wS
I and wo
I respectively (s means ￿signer￿ , and o means ￿free outsider￿ ). E
can o⁄er wholesale prices wE only to outsiders. We adopt the tie-break rule that at equal prices
distributors choose more e¢ cient ￿rm. Third, distributors decide which o⁄er to accept, or reject
all. Finally, distributors compete in the ￿nal market. They o⁄er each retail price to the ￿nal
consumers and ￿nal consumers buy at the lowest-price distributor.
First we examine the game at t=2. If S = N, that is all distributors signed the contract. the
entrant does not enter the market since there is no distributor who can trade with the entrant.
In this situation the incumbent sets its wholesale price, wS
I = v ￿ dI to all distributors and gets
the pro￿t ￿I = v ￿ dI ￿ cI ￿ Nx. On the other hand, distributors have to set their retail price v
with this wholesale price and get nothing.
Next, let suppose S = N ￿ 1, that is, one distributor rejected the o⁄er from the incumbent.
In this case, the entrant manufacturer has an incentive to enter the upstream market. Thus
the equilibrium wholesale price to the outsider is determined by the price competition between
the incumbent and the entrant. Since the entrant has lower marginal cost, the entrant wins the
competition and the equilibrium wholesale price becomes wo
I = wE = cI. On the other hand, only
the incumbent sells the product to the signed distributor. Here we suppose that the wholesale
price from the incumbent manufacturer to the signed distributor is, wS
I , and consider the retail
price competition. In this case the total cost (wholesale price plus distribution cost ) for the
signed distributor is wS
I + dI and that for the outsider is cI + dI. However, wS
I must be equal or
higher than cI since the production cost for the incumbent manufacturer is cI. This means that
wS
I + dI ￿ cI + dI and the outsider always wins the price competition in the retail market. The
pro￿t of the outsider is ￿O = wS
I ￿cI. How much the outsider can get is dependent upon wS
I . ￿O
can be v ￿ cI ￿ dI at most, and 0 at least. Since the incumbent cannot get any pro￿t by setting
any wS
I (as long as wS
I ￿ cI), the level of wS
I is indeterminate and there are multiple equilibria.
11At t=0, the incumbent should o⁄er x ￿ ￿O. Because ￿O is indeterminate and it may be too
large for incumbent to o⁄er, i.e. Nx > ￿I. Therefore we also have multiple equilibria at t=0.
Both exclusion and entry can occur at the equilibria.
In order to eliminate this multiplicity, Fumagalli and Motta introduced a small but positive
￿xed cost for distributors. The cost is denoted by ", and " > 0. In this positive ￿xed cost case,
distributors choose whether to be active or not at the third stage of t=1 (that is after observing
the all wholesale prices). This assumption can be interpreted as distributors will not purchase
any goods if they anticipate that they cannot win the retail price competition. In this case, there
exists only an exclusion equilibrium. Consider the case in which S = N ￿ 1. The entrant enters
the upstream market and o⁄ers the wholesale price wo
I = cI. On the other hand, the incumbent
o⁄ers the wholesale price wS
I to the signed distributor, but wS
I + dI ￿ cI + dI and it can be
expected that the outsider wins the price competition even if the signed distributor accepted the
o⁄er. Thus, the signer must choose to be inactive when it must pay the positive ￿xed cost for
distribution. Then the outsider can monopolize the retail market and it is the best strategy for
it to o⁄er the monopoly retail price v. By this strategy, its pro￿t becomes ￿O = v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ ".
Since all players can anticipate this outcome, the necessary compensation level should be x = ￿O
= v￿cI ￿dI ￿". We should remind wS
I = v￿dI ￿" and ￿I = v￿dI ￿cI ￿"￿Nx when S = N:
Hence the compensation level above is too high and ￿I = v ￿dI ￿cI ￿"￿N(v ￿cI ￿dI ￿") < 0
since we assume that N ￿ 2. This means that the incumbent cannot deter the entry by the
exclusive dealing contract, and there must be only entry equilibria.
As a conclusion, in FM model, it is impossible for an ine¢ cient manufacturer to deter an
e¢ cient entrant manufacturer by exclusive dealing contracts as long as downstream ￿rms should
pay very small ￿xed cost. If there is no ￿xed cost, the exclusion can be one of the equilibria.
Our result is sharply di⁄erent from the result of FM mainly in the following two points. One
is that the equilibrium at t=0 is unique in our model even without considering any ￿xed cost
assumptions. The other point is that exclusion of the e¢ cient entrant occurs at the equilibrium.
Regarding the ￿rst point, even if an outsider exists, the signed manufacturers still have a chance
to win in our model. Hence the whole sale price competition occurs severely and it generates the
unique outcome. On the other hand, in FM model, the incumbent manufacturer realizes that it
cannot win if there is an outsider and thus the wholesale price o⁄er from it becomes indeterminate.
The second di⁄erence comes from the following reason. When there is an outside distributor
in FM, the incumbent manufacturer and an entrant manufacturer compete and the wholesale
12price o⁄er to the outsider becomes low. That means this competition raises the pro￿t of the
outsider and the necessary compensation level. On the other hand, in our model, the competition
of the incumbent distributor and the entrant distributor decreases the equilibrium retail price and
thus it does not increase the pro￿t of the outsider. Hence it is not impossible for the incumbent
distributor to deter an e¢ cient distributor. This is an intuitive reason why the outcome of this
paper is quite opposite to that of FM. The outcome shows that e⁄ects of exclusive dealing contracts
are not so simple as we have imaged before. Whether the contract is o⁄ered from a manufacturer
or a distributor is crucial for the outcome and the judgment of the contract.
3.2 Large Distributor Model with Fixed Cost Assumption
Now we will show that even if downstream ￿rms (both of the incumbent and the entrant ) have to
cover a small but positive ￿xed cost " as Fumagalli and Motta (2006), our results do not change.
To incorporate this assumption, we now introduce one additional stage just before the fourth
stage at t=1. Before the retail price o⁄ering, distributors choose to be active or inactive10.
Suppose one manufacturer rejected the o⁄er, that is S = N ￿ 1. In this case, as explained
in the previous section, the wholesale price to the incumbent, wI becomes wI = cI by the price
competition among manufacturers. On the other hand, only the outsider supplies the product to
the entrant. It follows that the outsider raises up the wholesale price o⁄er to the entrant, wE > cI.
If wE > cI + (dI ￿ dE), the incumbent would be active since the total marginal cost of the
incumbent, cI+dI, is lower than that of the entrant, wE+dE. In this case, the incumbent can win
the retail price competition. In other words, the entrant becomes inactive since it would surely
lose in the retail price competition. The outsider gains nothing by rejecting the contract. Hence
it is not the best strategy for the outsider to set wE > cI + (dI ￿ dE). On the other hand, if
wE = cI +￿(dI ￿dE) and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, the incumbent becomes inactive since cI +dI ￿ wE +dE
11.
Hence the entrant distributor has a chance to set its retail price is equal to v and gets v￿dE￿wE.
The pro￿t of the entrant is, however,
￿E = cI + dI ￿ cI ￿ ￿(dI ￿ dE) ￿ dE ￿ " = (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE) ￿ ". (5)
10We assume that the wholesale price from the outsider to the entrant distributor, wE is determined by Nash
bargaining between the entrant and the outsider with ￿ the parameter of the outsider￿ s bargaining power and
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. It include the result when manufacturers can o⁄er wholesale price to distributors with ￿ = 1.
11From the assumption about the tie-breaking rule, the incumbent cannot win the price competition if cI +dI =
wE + dE.
13and we assume " is small enough and that (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE) ￿ " > 0.
This is just same as the pro￿t in the previous section. Therefore, the necessary compensation
level x is just same as the result in the previous section (x￿ = ￿(dI￿dE)), and we get the following
condition;
￿I ￿ 0 () N ￿ N0(￿) =
(v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ ")
￿(dI ￿ dE)
: (6)
In particular, when ￿ = 1, N ￿ N0(1) = (v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ ")=(dI ￿ dE) and N0(1) = N￿ as
" ￿! 0. That means even if there is a small but positive ￿xed cost as in the Fumagalli and Motta
(2006), our argument in the previous section is not a⁄ected at all. The intuitive reason of this
result is simple. In this model with ￿xed costs, the incumbent may become inactive if it has no
chance to win the retail price competition, but it only raises the pro￿t of the entrant distributor.
If the outsider o⁄ers too high wholesale prices, the incumbent has a chance to win the retail price
competition with a signer. Thus the outsider cannot raise the retail price su¢ ciently to absorb
the increased pro￿t of the entrant. As a result, the outsider cannot get any extra gain even if
there is a ￿xed cost and the exclusive dealing contract can work successfully for the exclusion of
entrants.
This result is still quite contrast to that of Fumagalli and Motta (2006). In the case of FM, the
outsider is a distributor. Hence if other distributors became inactive, it can get very high pro￿t
by absorbing consumer surplus. On the other hand, the outsider is a manufacturer in this model.
It cannot set such a high wholesale price to absorb consumer surplus, because of the threat of the
signers. Therefore the outsider cannot get high payo⁄12.
4 One Weak Entry at Upstream in the Large Distributor Model
In this section we introduce an entrant at upstream as in Figure 313. Similar to Aghion and
Bolton (1987), we assume the marginal cost of an entrant manufacturer (EM), cE, is uncertain ex
12One might consider the case in which manufacturer have to pay the small ￿xed cost to compare the setting of
FM. Even if we consider such ￿xed cost, however, any manufacturers do not become inactive, since all manufacturers
have same cost condition and all of them have a chance to win the wholesale price competition. Hence even if we
introduce the ￿xed cost assumption in the upstream market, we do not get the same result with FM.
13As Whinston (2004) states, the literature has been limited to ￿one buyer and several sellers, or between one
seller and several buyers￿(pp.175). To answer more realistic questions, ￿models with competing sellers and more
than one buyer￿ and ￿[f]urther study of multiseller/multibuyer models￿ should be a high priority (pp.177). By




















Figure 3: A Weak Entrant Manufacturer (EM)
ante14. At t=0, all players know that cE is cL
E(> cI) with probability q(> 0) and cH
E(> cL
E > cI)
with probability (1 ￿ q), that is the entrant manufacturer is less e¢ cient than the incumbent
manufacturer15. We assume that cH
E + dE > cI + dI > cL
E + dE and v ￿ cH
E + dI. At t=1, cE
realizes and all players recognize the realized value of cE.
The weak entrant modi￿es the game slightly. At t=0, the incumbent distributor o⁄ers exclusive
dealing contracts to manufacturers. At t=1, we have four stages. First, after observing S, the
e¢ cient entrant distributor (E) and the ine¢ cient manufacturer (EM) decide to enter or not.
Second, manufacturers o⁄er wholesale prices to distributors. We denote the o⁄ers to I and E from
EM by wE
I and wE
E respectively. Third, distributors decide whether they want to be active or
not. In this model, we assume that the small positive ￿xed cost, " > 0 for distributors cover as
in Fumagalli and Motta model described above16. Then, the active distributors accept or reject
each wholesale price o⁄er they receive. Finally, distributors engage in retail price competition a
la Bertrand17.
14Even if we assume there is no uncertainty about EM￿ s cost, qualitative property of our result does not change
at all.
15Later in this section, we examine the case of c
L
E < cI, i.e. there is a possibility that the entrant manufacturer
is more e¢ cient than the incumbent manufacturer.
16We apply the positive ￿xed cost assumption to eliminate multiplicity of wholesale price equilibrium as FM
do. However, even without the ￿xed cost assumption, we only have S = N at the equilibrium with appropriate
parameters in our model unlike FM￿ s result. We just assume the positive ￿xed cost for notation simplicity.
17Here we will not introduce Nash bargaining to determine wholesale price. As we showed in Section 2, Nash
bargaining will reduce the necessary amount of x. This if an exclusion equilibrium exists without Nash bargaining
15In this case, even if S = N, the entrant distributor can be active in the retail market when
cE = cL
E. Since cI + dI ￿ cL
E + dE, the pair of E and EM has cost advantage and the incumbent
distributor cannot exclude the entrant even with fully signed contracts (S = N).
When S = N, the equilibrium wholesale price to the incumbent distributor, wN
I should be
equal to cI by the price competition among all manufacturers (including the entrant manufac-
turer). Since cL
E > cI, wE
I becomes higher than cI and does not a⁄ect the equilibrium wholesale
price to the incumbent distributor. On the other hand, only the entrant manufacturer can supply
the product to the entrant distributor. Hence, the manufacturer absorbs the extra pro￿t by rais-
ing the wholesale price. By the fact that the entrant distributor wins the retail price competition
as long as wE
E + dE ￿ cI + dI, the optimal wholesale price should be wE
E = cI + dI ￿ dE and the
entrant manufacturer gets wE
E ￿cL
E = cI+dI￿cL
E￿dE > 0. All (signed) incumbent manufacturers
get zero. By observing those wholesale prices, the incumbent distributor decides to be inactive
since wI + dI ￿ wE
E + dE. As a result, the entrant distributor chooses the monopoly retail price,
p = v and gets the pro￿t ￿E = v ￿ cI ￿ dE ￿ ". In this cE = cL
E case, the e¢ cient entrant
distributor can be survived, but the ine¢ cient entrant manufacturer supplies the product to the
distributor.
On the other hand, when cE = cH
E, the incumbent distributor can exclude the e¢ cient entrant
since cI + dI < cH
E + dE. Even with the entrant manufacturer, the entrant distributor has no
competitiveness. We will show this point. The wholesale price o⁄er from the entrant manufacturer
is equal or higher than cH
E, wE
E ￿ cH
E. On the other hand, the signers compete a la Bertrand and
wN
I = cI. Hence cI +dI < wE
E +dE and the entrant distributor chooses to be inactive. The retail
price becomes p = v and the incumbent distributor gets ￿I = v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ ". In summary, at
t=0, the expected payo⁄ of the incumbent distributor is E [￿I] = (1￿q)(v￿cI ￿dI ￿") and that
of the (signed) incumbent manufacturers is 0 as long as S = N:.
Next, to derive the optimal compensation level of x, let us suppose that S = N ￿ 1 (one
outsider exists) and examine how much the outsider can get. First we check the case cE = cH
E
(and cI + dI < cH
E + dE). In this case, the entrant manufacturer does not a⁄ect the market
equilibrium at all. the wholesale price to the incumbent distributor becomes, wI = cI by the price
competition among manufacturers, and the entrant manufacturer does not a⁄ect the equilibrium
price since cH
E > cI. The outsider maximizes the wholesale price to the entrant distributor under
the constraint that the entrant distributor wins the retail price competition, and the equilibrium
scheme, there surely exits an exclusion equilibrium under Nash bargaining scheme.
16wholesale price to the entrant distributor become wE = cI + (dI ￿ dE). Once again the entrant
manufacturer is not e⁄ective since cH
E is higher than this wE. Thus the outsider can get the pro￿t,
wE ￿ cI = dI ￿ dE.
On the other hand, when cL
E is realized, the outsider has to compete with the entrant manufac-
turer for supplying the product to the entrant manufacturer. By the wholesale price competition,
wE = cL
E and the outsider gets cL
E ￿ cI. The wholesale price to the incumbent manufacturer
becomes wI = cI by the price competition among manufacturers. Since wI + dI ￿ wE + dE,
the entrant distributor wins the retail price competition even in this case. In summary, if one
incumbent manufacturer rejected the o⁄er (i.e. becoming the outsider), it can get dI ￿ dE with
probability 1￿q and cL
E ￿cI with probability q, but the incumbent distributor gets nothing. This
means the necessary compensation level, x￿ should be (1 ￿ q)(dI ￿ dE) + q(cL
E ￿ cI).
Hence, the exclusive dealing contracts are fully signed if the number of the incumbent manu-
facturers satis￿es the following condition18;
N ￿ N￿￿ =
(1 ￿ q)(v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ ")
(1 ￿ q)(dI ￿ dE) + q(cL
E ￿ cI)
: (7)
The number of upstream incumbent ￿rms is less than N￿￿, exclusive dealing contracts can
be signed by all incumbent upstream ￿rms. In this "fully signed" equilibrium, when cE = cH
E(￿
cI + dI ￿ dE), the e¢ cient entrant distributor cannot enter the market. Obviously it generates
social ine¢ ciency. Furthermore, when cL
E is realized, the e¢ cient entrant distributor trades with
the ine¢ cient entrant manufacturer and wins the retail market competition. In other words, even
by the exclusive dealing contracts, an entrant distributor may not be excluded but an ine¢ cient
entrant manufacturer can enter the market. It is another source of social ine¢ ciency.
N￿￿ should be lower than N￿. It implies that the existence of entrant manufacturer makes
exclusion more di¢ cult. The intuitive reason is as follows. If the cost condition of the entrant
manufacturer is not so bad, cL
E, the incumbent distributor cannot get positive pro￿t even if
all Incumbent manufacturers signed the exclusive contracts at t=0 since the combination of the
entrants (E and EM) is more e¢ cient than that of the incumbents. On the other hand, the outsider
can get positive pro￿t even when cE = cL
E. Hence the compensation level becomes relatively
high for the incumbent distributor and it is more di¢ cult to exclude the entrant distributor.
Proposition 2 summarize the analysis.






E￿cI) . All the analysis below remains the same even with this condition.
17Proposition 2 The possibility of entry in the upstream may make the exclusive contract by the
incumbent distributor more di¢ cult when an upstream entrant is ine¢ cient in the sense cE is
cL
E(> cI) with probability q(> 0) and cH
E(> cL
E > cI) with probability (1￿q). Even if all incumbent
manufacturers sign the exclusive contract, the entrant distributor can survive by trading with the
ine¢ cient entrant manufacturer. This is another source of social ine¢ ciency.
Proof. See above.
Interestingly, such entrant does not a⁄ect the outcome at all in the FM model. In the appendix,
we extend the ine¢ cient entrant model to FM model, and show that their result does not change
even with an ine¢ cient entrant distributor.
Next, we brie￿ y examine the case where cL
E < cI, that is the entrant manufacturer is more
e¢ cient than the incumbent manufacturer with probability q(> 0), and with probability 1 ￿ q,
cH
E > cI + dI ￿ dE. If cE = cL
E(< cI), obviously the incumbent manufacturers and the incumbent
distributor get zero when S = N. Moreover, even if S = N ￿ 1, the outsider cannot win the
wholesale price competition with the entrant manufacturer, and thus the incumbent manufacturers
including the outsider, and the incumbent distributor get zero. When cE = cH
E, the outcome is
just the same as in the previous argument. The outsider can get dI ￿ dE and the incumbent
distributor gets v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ ".
This means the necessary compensation level is x￿ = (1 ￿ q)(dI ￿ dE) . When S = N, the
incumbent distributor can get (without including the compensation payments) v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ "
with probability 1￿q and 0 with probability q . Hence (1￿q)(v￿cI ￿dI ￿")￿(1￿q)(dI ￿dE)N
should be positive or zero, and the threshold level of N; denoted by N
00
;can be derived as follows.
N ￿ N00 =
v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ "
dI ￿ dE
: (8)
Obviously N00 is higher than N￿￿. The more e¢ cient the entrant manufacturer becomes, the more
likely the exclusive dealing contracts prevent the e¢ cient entrant distributor. We summarize the
result by following proposition.
Proposition 3 If there is a possibility that an entrant in the upstream is more e¢ cient than
incumbent upstream ￿rms, exclusion occurs more likely at the equilibrium than in the case of
ine¢ cient entrant in the upstream.
Proof. See above.
18Comparing this condition with equation (7) with ￿ = 1, we get N0(1) = N00. It implies that if
entrant manufacturer is more e¢ cient than incumbent with positive probability, the condition for
fully signed exclusive dealing contracts is just same as no entrant manufacturer case. However,
social welfare is larger in entrant manufacturer case than in no entrant manufacturer case. When
EM exists and S = N, the entrant manufacturer and the entrant distributor can win the retail
market competition with probability q > 0. This vertical structure is more e¢ cient than the
combination of incumbents.
In addition, the result that N00 > N￿￿ is rather counter intuitive. This means that if the
productivity of the entrant manufacturer is improved, the exclusion of the entrant distributor is
more likely to occur. An intuitive reason is as follows. Even if cL
E becomes lower than cI, the
expected payo⁄ of the incumbent distributor does not change since it cannot win the retail price
competition when cL
E is realized as long as cL
E ￿ cI + dI ￿ dE. On the other hand, the outsider￿ s
expected payo⁄substantially decreases from q(dI￿dE)+(1￿q)(cL
E￿cI) to q(dI￿dE) since it loses
the wholesale price competition only if cL
E is lower than cI. Hence the necessary compensation
level becomes lower and the threshold level of N can be higher. Because the exclusion of the
entrant distributor is welfare decreasing, this result means that the technological improvement of
the entrant manufacturer may decrease the social welfare 19.
5 Conclusion
The existing literature on the anti-competitive e⁄ects of exclusive dealing contracts have been
developed to the case when buyers are competing distributors recently. Especially, Fumagalli and
Motta (2006) have shown that intense competition among distributors eliminates the incumbent￿ s
incentive to exclude by exclusive contracts20. They claim that exclusive dealing contracts would
not be anti-competitive in such circumstances.
Our model has suggested that this result would be reversed by assuming a distributor tries to
deter an entry. We have shown that an incumbent large distributor can use exclusive dealing con-
tracts to deter an e¢ cient rival￿ s entry, when the number of manufacturers is in some range. This
result has important implications for antitrust policy. The incumbent distributor can foreclose by
19In the appendix, we introduce an ine¢ cient entrant distributor to the Fumagalli and Motta model. We show
that the result we have in Section 3 would not be a⁄ected by the entrant distributor in the FM model.
20They call Bertrand competition among two distributors as "extremely intense competition in downstream".
Thus even though there are two large distributors in our model (implicitly it is as a result of concentration among
distributors), we can say that distributors are "intensely competing" in our model along with FM￿ s wording.
19exclusivity clause when they are large. When concentration among distributors is strengthened
in an industry, the incumbent may prevent a price cutting new distributor￿ s entry by exclusive
contracts. By comparison with the result of Fumagalli and Motta (2006), this would happen more
certainly than entry prevention of e¢ cient producers.
In addition, the entry in the upstream, even if the entrant is less e¢ cient than incumbents,
can make the exclusion unfeasible. Thus, by promotion of entry in the upstream, even if entrants
are less e¢ cient than incumbents, e¢ cient entry in the downstream would be promoted.
Note that even if we assume the exclusive dealing contracts are breachable by paying expecta-
tion damage, we have an unique exclusion equilibrium. Moreover, In the large distributor model,
we do not have multiple equilibria that Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) have without assuming
product di⁄erentiation.
A Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs for the following models. In Section A, we explore other scheme
to determine wholesale prices and show that whichever we apply, exclusion would occur at the
equilibrium. In Section B, we examine FM model with an ine¢ cient entrant distributor. We show
that the ine¢ cient entrant never a⁄ects the result of FM. There exists only entry equilibrium with
the assumption of small ￿xed cost for distributors.
A.1 Other Schemes to Determine Wholesale Price
In this section, we explore other scheme to determine wholesale prices. In the basic model, each
distributors can make "take it or leave it wholesale price o⁄ers" to manufactures. Instead, here
we assume they make "distribution margin o⁄ers", or assume that they cannot o⁄er any price,
and manufacturers can o⁄er their own wholesale price to distributors.
Following Comanor and Rey (2000), we employ the "distribution margin o⁄er". At t=1, after
the entry decision, distributors can o⁄er their distribution margins instead of wholesale prices to
manufacturers and manufacturers prefer lowest margin distributor. We denote margin o⁄ers from
the incumbent to free manufactures m
f
I, and to captive manufacturers ms
I. On the other hand,
having entered, the entrant distributor o⁄ers margin mE only to free manufacturers. After that,
manufacturers o⁄er wholesale price to distributors. We denote wholesale prices by wf from free
manufactures and ws from captive manufacturers. Then distributors compete a la Bertrand in
20the retail market. Indeed, margin plus wholesale price, i.e. m + w, is the retail price. All the
settings except this would remain the same as in Section 3.
If S = N, obviously E cannot enter the downstream. Then, I o⁄ers each IM ms
I = v ￿dI, and
all IMs receive it. They o⁄er ws = cI: Enjoying monopoly position, I o⁄ers consumer the retail
price PI = v. Followings are active players payo⁄s.
￿I = v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ Nx
￿s
IM = x:
When one IM deviates from signing, i.e. S = N ￿1, E will enter. E and I o⁄er mE = m
f
I = dI
for a free IM respectively. This is almost like Bertrand competition for IM. I also o⁄ers ms
I = dI:
Now manufactures are actually competing at the retail market given distribution margins, and
both the free and the captive o⁄er wf = ws = cI. This makes deviation would not be attractive,
as resulting ￿
f
IM = 0. Thus, the number of IM would not matter. With the compensation x = 0,
all IMs sign the contract at t=0.
A.2 FM Model with a Weak Entrant Distributor
We introduce an ine¢ cient entrant at downstream as in Section 3. The entrant distributor, ED,
has marginal cost of dE, that is uncertain ex ante. We assume that at t=0, all player know that
dE is dL
E(> dI) with probability q and dH
E(> dL
E) with probability (1 ￿ q), and also assume that
dH
E + cE > dI + cI > dL
E + cE: Thus ED is weakly less e¢ cient than IM. At t=1, dE realizes and
all players know the exact value of dE. We also assume that dH
E + dI ￿ v.
The weak entrant modi￿es the game slightly. At t=1, ￿rst, ED will enter the upstream
market. We assume no ￿xed entry cost for EM. Second, each manufacturer determines their
wholesale prices. We denote the o⁄ers from IM and EM to EM by wE
I and wE
E respectively. The
third and ￿nal stages are the same as the basic model in Section 2.
If S = N, along with the same logic, the entrant manufacturer (E) can be active with the
ine¢ cient entrant manufacturer in the retail market when dE = dL
E due to the assumption of
dI +cI ￿ dL
E +cE: In this case, as a result of Bertrand competition, the retail price is PE = PI =
cI + dI. With ED￿ s payo⁄ denoted by ￿ED, the payo⁄s are




￿ED = dI + cI ￿ (dL
E + cE):
On the other hand, when dE = dH
E, due to the assumption of dI +cI < dH
E +cE, the incumbent
distributor can exclude the e¢ cient entrant. Thus as a result of Bertrand competition, the retail
price is PE = PI = dH
E + cE. The payo⁄s are
￿I = dH





Next, to derive the level of x., let us suppose that S = N ￿ 1 (there is one outsider). The
equilibrium would change that of in our large distributor model. In this case, the outsider has
strictly less cost than the entrant distributor (ED) which dE would be realized. Thus the entrant
and the incumbent would compete a la Bertrand with their wholesale price for the outsider.
The o⁄ers from E and I to the outsider are denoted by wo
E and wo
I respectively. We have the
unique equilibrium of wo
E = wo
I = cI and the entrant wins the wholesale price competition for the
outsider. As the same logic, the incumbent is indi⁄erent whatever it o⁄ers signers ws
I (￿ cI) On
the other hand, the o⁄er to the entrant distributor wE
I and wE
E would be undetermined. Moreover,
Both I and E are indi⁄erent of o⁄ering to EM or not. As a result of Bertrand competition, the
retail price is PE = PI = dI + ws
I, and with the tie-break rule assumption, the outsider wins the
retail price competition. Apparently the existence of ED would not a⁄ect the equilibrium. When




I ￿ cI. With the multiplicity of ws
I, ￿o
ID
is undetermined similarly with FM model above.
To eliminate multiplicity, we can introduce a small ￿xed cost " > 0 to distributors. In this
case, ￿o
ID = v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ ". Obviously ￿I = q(dH
E + cE ￿ dI ￿ cI) ￿ Nx cannot be positive if
x ￿ v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ ". Thus there only exists an entry equilibrium, with the same logic as in their
original paper. Again, the entrant distributor, ED, has no e⁄ect on the entry equilibrium.
22Next we examine the case where dL
E < dI, that is the entrant distributor is more e¢ cient
than the incumbent manufacturer with probability q, and with probability 1 ￿ q, dE = dH
E >
dI + cI ￿ cE as in the previous argument. We focus on the case with the assumption of a small
￿xed cost " > 0 for distributors for shortness. If dL
E < dI, obviously the incumbent manufacturers
and the incumbent distributor get zero even when S = N. Moreover, even if S = N ￿ 1, the
outsider cannot win the retail price competition with the entrant, and thus both the incumbent
manufacturers and the incumbent distributor get zero. This means the necessary compensation
level is x = (1 ￿ q)(v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ ") and the incumbent distributor can get (without including
the compensation payments) dH
E +cE ￿dI ￿cI with probability (1￿q) and 0 with probability q.
Hence for all N > 0, we have
￿I = (1 ￿ q)dH
E + cE ￿ dI ￿ cI ￿ (1 ￿ q)N(v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ ") < 0: (9)
Thus, we still have unique entry equilibrium, because the incumbent cannot pro￿tably o⁄er the
exclusive dealing contracts to the incumbent distributors.
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